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The report shows that the promotion of IWRM
icons such as RBOs by donors has been quite
disconnected from the existing institutional
framework. In contradiction with IWRM principles,
RBOs were established under the Ministry of
Agriculture and Rural Development (MARD), with
little means and power, while the ONWRC remained
dormant. The RRBO was set up on the premise
that a RBO was needed, but it was soon found that
basin-wide participation was both difficult and
unnecessary, with the focus being shifted to lower
sub-basin levels.
The report also shows that if policy reforms
promoted by donors and development banks have
triggered some changes, these changes may have
come not as a result of the reforms themselves but,
rather, due to the institutional confusion they have
created when confronted with the emergence of the
MoNRE, which itself was largely destined – at first
– to solving land rather than water issues. For the
MoNRE, the river basin scale became crucial for
grounding its legitimacy and finding its roles among
the established layers of the administration, while for
MARD, RBOs became a focal point where power
over financial resources and political power might
potentially be relocated at its expense. Thus, the
collision of donor-driven projects to establish RBOs
and the conflict between MARD and MoNRE helped
strengthen changes in the direction of a better
separation of duties and integrated planning. It is too
early to assess whether this transition towards a
separation of the operation and regulation roles will
be sustained, and whether RBOs will be endowed
with substantial power. However, institutional change
is shown to result from the interaction between
endogenous processes and external pressures, in
ways that are barely predictable.
Summary
In the last decade many Southeast Asian countries
have remodeled part or all of their water policies.
Development banks, notably the Asian Development
Bank (ADB), and multilateral cooperation agencies
have been quite influential in supporting the
adoption of policies and reforms that embody
principles held as modern and internationally
sanctioned. This includes the drafting of national
policy and laws, the creation of ‘apex bodies’, the
establishment of river basin organizations (RBOs),
the privatization of public companies, and increased
financial contribution from users (e.g., through water
pricing and the formation of water user groups).
While these principles and reforms provide sound
and useful guidelines for national water policies at
a certain level of generalization, their confrontation
with reality has more often than not yielded
disappointing results.
Vietnam has recently adopted several of these
policy recommendations. A new Law on Water
Resources released in 1998 was followed by the
creation of an ‘apex body’ (the Office of the National
Water Resources Council (ONWRC) in 2000), and
three RBOs (in 2001), before the Ministry of Natural
Resources and Environment (MoNRE) was set up
in 2002. Although institutional changes are often
gradual, these few years of experience in reforming
the water sector offer an opportunity to examine the
implementation of these new policy frameworks.
The present report focuses on the establishment of
the Red River Basin Organization (RRBO), but
expands its analysis to the wider transformations of
the water sector that impinge on the formation and
effectiveness of this organization. A few reflections
on the policy process are drawn from this analysis,
albeit in a tentative form given the relatively limited
period of time considered here.1
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Introduction
In the last decade, many southeast Asian
countries have remodeled part or all of their water
policies. This is due to recurring crises (water
shortages, flood damage, pollution, etc.) and also
due to global initiatives and networking that have
given greater public salience to water issues, and
the influence of development banks and cooperation
agencies that have been pushing for reforms (Molle
2005). In Asia, principles of Integrated Water
Resources Management (IWRM) and river basin
management (RBM) have been fostered by several
organizations, among others, the ADB, the World
Bank, the Global Water Partnership (GWP), and
United Nations Economic and Social Commission
for Asia and the Pacific (ESCAP), and also by
regional events (e.g., Southeast Asian water
forums) and networks (e.g., Network of Asian River
Basin Organizations). The ADB, in particular, has
been quite active in supporting the adoption of
policies and reforms, from member countries, that
embody principles held as modern and
internationally sanctioned. This includes the
drafting of national policy and laws, the creation of
’apex bodies’ (i.e., inter-ministerial councils,
supported by permanent offices, that define overall
guidelines and policies on water issues) (ADB
2000; Birch 2004; Arriens 2004), the establishment
of RBOs, the privatization of public companies,
and increased financial and other contributions from
users (e.g., through water pricing and the formation
of water user groups).
While these principles and reforms provide
sound and useful guidelines for national water
policies at a certain level of generalization, their
confrontation with reality has frequently yielded
disappointing results. Water reforms have been
marred by physical, environmental and
sociopolitical complexities that had generally not
been anticipated (Sampath 1992; Mollinga and
Bolding 2004); water pricing reforms have seldom,
if ever, achieved the gains anticipated (Dinar and
Saleth 2005; Molle and Berkoff 2007); IWRM has
gained wide acceptance but has proved hard to
operationalize (Biswas 2004; Molle et al. 2007); the
promotion of ‘apex bodies’ and RBOs in Asia has
also yielded mixed results (Newborne 2006). Many
analysts have discussed and questioned the
conditions and the possibility of transfers. For
example, the Australian experience to the Mekong
River Basin (Chenoweth 1999; Pigram 2001;
Malano et al. 1999; Birch et al. 1999), in particular,
the possibility to “leapfrog” from one particular
situation to a model developed in another country
(Shah et al. 2001).
Vietnam has recently adopted several of these
policy recommendations. A new Law on Water
Resources (LWR 1998), in 1998, was followed by
the creation of an ‘apex body’ (the ONWRC) in
2000, and three RBOs in 2001, before MoNRE was
set up in 2002. Although institutional changes are
often incremental, these few years of experience in
reforming the water sector offer an opportunity to
examine the implementation of these new policy
frameworks. The present report first provides some
information about the water sector in Vietnam,
then focuses on the establishment of the RRBO
but expands its analysis to the wider
transformations of the water sector that impinge on2
the formation and effectiveness of this organization.
A few reflections on the policy process are drawn
from this analysis, albeit in a tentative form given
the relatively limited period of time considered here.
Institutional Change in the Vietnamese Water Sector
The transformations of the Vietnamese water
sector have dovetailed with both historical and
political events and, more recently, economic
reforms. Figure 1 provides a quick bird’s-eye view
of its main benchmarks during the past 60 years.
It is interesting to note that a Red River
Committee was established in 1961, under the then
Ministry of Water Resources, and that its
permanent office later transformed into the Institute
for Water Resources Planning and Management.
The main current actor in the water sector, MARD,
emerged in 1995 with the merging of three
ministries: Agriculture-Food Industry, Forestry, and
Water Resources.
The Law on Water Resources
Work on the drafting of the Law on Water
Resources began after the policy changes (Doi Moi
– ‘reform’ in Vietnamese) of 1986 and was
supported by the World Bank through the provision
of legal experts. As many as 17 drafts were
developed before the final version was approved by
the National Assembly of Vietnam in April 1998 and
enacted on January 1, 1999 (Malano et al. 1999).
The Law does not mention “integrated
management” and there are only two occurrences
of “Integrated use of the water resource” stated.
The principle of managing of water resources by
river basin is enshrined in the Law, but not
prominently. Article 20 merely states that “The
regulation and distribution of water resource for use
purposes must be based on the planning of the
river basin and the real potential of the water
source and must ensure the principle of fairness,
reasonability and priority in the quantity and quality
of water for living.” Article 64 enjoins the
government to make “concrete provisions for the
organization and activities of the agency managing
the planning of the river basin”. State management
functions are clearly assigned to MARD, line
agencies, and People’s Committees of the
provinces: Article 58 of Chapter 7 specifies that “The
Ministry of Agriculture and Rural Development is
answerable to the government for the carrying out of
the State management function on water resource”.
Two years after the passing of the Law, in
June 2000, the National Water Resources Council
(NWRC) was established as an apex body that
was meant to advise the government on strategies
and policies regarding national water resources,
major river basin plans and inter-basin water
transfers, management of international water
sources and resolution of water-related conflicts
between ministries and agencies, or ministries and
provinces.
 It was to be chaired by the Vice Prime
Minister, assisted by the Minister of MARD, and
had 18 members belonging to the various
ministries concerned. The ONWRC was
established within MARD (under the Department of
Water Resources and Hydraulic Works
Management) in June 2001 and received its annual
budget from this ministry.
One year later, River Basin Planning
Management Boards (RBPMB) were created in
three major river basins, namely the Mekong (Cuu
Long), Dong Nai and Red-Thai Binh, to manage,
i.e., to coordinate, river basin planning
management, pursuant to Article 64 of the Law on
Water Resources. The RBPMB were three-tiered
RBOs with a governing Board, a managing Office
or Secretariat (placed under the Institute for Water
Resources Planning (IWARP)), and stakeholders.
Their role was only defined later by a decision on
their regulation issued in 2004.3
FIGURE 1. Summary of institutional change in the water sector. Note: Boxes with green color relate to RBO activity.4
The Advent of the Ministry of Natural
Resources and Environment
The creation of MoNRE in August 2002 was an
important part of the reforms aimed at
‘modernizing’ the State, separating public
administrative agencies from public service delivery
agencies and promoting the separation of
regulation/management (handled by MoNRE) from
operation or construction (handled by line
agencies), that were launched in 2001 (Su et al.
2004; Hydrosult and Arcadis 2005). This created a
somewhat odd situation due to the fact that RBOs
were being implemented at the same time under
the purview of a sectoral ministry (MARD), with the
support of donors who had launched the Second
Red River Basin Sector Project (2RRBSP)
approximately a year prior to the advent of MoNRE.
This raises the question of why the MoNRE
emerged in a context that it was not, apparently,
ready for (in particular, it was not envisioned in the
Law on Water Resources and that made it hard to
transfer the water resource management functions
and responsibilities for RBM - that had just been
entrusted to MARD - to MoNRE). Partial answers
to this riddle are that MoNRE was established
mainly to deal with the pressing issues at the time
of integrating land administration and environmental
management, especially pollution control, that
were beyond the capacity of the former General
Department of Land Administration; and that the
role of MoNRE in water management was initially
not a major concern. On November 11, 2002,
Government Decree No. 91 specified the functions,
responsibility, authority and the organizational
structure of MoNRE as a “government body to
exercise the state function of management over the
land, water resources, minerals, environment,
meteorology, hydrogeography, measuring and
mapping in the national scope…” (GoV 2002).
This was followed by the MoNRE Decision No.
600/2003/QD-BTNMT of May 8, 2003 on the
functions and responsibilities of the Department of
Water Resources Management (DWRM) that
readily put MoNRE on a collision course with
MARD. The Decision specified that the DWRM
was an agency within MoNRE with the “function to
assist the Minister in implementing state
management of water resources including
rainwater, surface water, groundwater, and seawater
in river basins, in land and sea territory of the
Socialist Republic of Vietnam” (MoNRE 2003;
emphasis added). Among other things, the
department was made responsible for developing
“legal documents, policies, strategies, long-term,
five-year, and annual plans, programs, and projects
on water resources protection, exploitation,
utilization and development.”
MARD versus MoNRE: Turf Battle over
Roles
Two months after Decision No. 600, in July 2003,
Government Decree 86/2003/ND-CP on the
“Functions, tasks, powers and organizational
structure of the Ministry of Agriculture and Rural
Development” confirmed MARD’s duty with regard
to “state management functions over agriculture,
forestry, salt industry, water resources and rural
development nationwide” (GoV 2003a; emphasis
added). It must submit drafts of laws, ordinances
and other legal documents, and also strategies,
master plans of development, long-term, five-year
term and annual plans, and key programs, projects
on the domains being put under its management to
the government and Prime Minister.
Perhaps, as a means of repositioning itself
within this new administrative environment and
bolstering its claim to a management role, the
MARD Minister issued a Decision on September 4,
2003 that specified the functions and organization
of the Department of Water Resources (DWR), in
replacement of the Department of Water Resources
and Hydraulic Works Management. Its state
management function over water resources in the
entire nation included exploration, operation and
protection of water resources for hydraulic works,
rural water supply and drainage, RBM, protection
from waterlogging and drought in the whole
country. In response to donors, MARD also
designed operational regulations for the RBOs that
were placed under its purview (MARD 2004).
With both ministries claiming “state
management functions” for water, the confusion
and inter-ministerial conflict heightened and led to5
several strategic moves. MARD issued a Decision
in April 2004 which established a General Office for
River Basins Planning Management with the
mandate to assist the Director of the DWR in
collaborating with ministries, agencies and provincial
people’s committees (PPC) to implement the
functions and responsibilities of the RBPMBs. The
structure of the Office provided space for the
Director of the DWRM of MoNRE on a seemingly
equal footing as the DWR and the IWARP (of
MARD). However, the Director of DWRM reportedly
shunned the initiative and sent representatives to
attend the meetings.
With the confusion created with reference to
“State management functions” in both government
decrees (Nos. 91/2002 and 86/2003), MARD
endeavored to establish semantic distinctions
based on its legal role as the host’ of RBOs. Since
water management had to be carried out at the
basin level and since the Law on Water Resources
provided for RBOs to be hosted by MARD, all the
State functions related to planning and
construction, in particular, would be based on basin
plans prepared by that Ministry. MoNRE, in turn,
would be responsible for state water management
at the national level, and not at the river basin
level. Presumably its role would be confined to
designing national strategies and regulation norms,
such as rules to allocate water and pollution
standards. It would not be directly involved in basin-
wide development plans and construction, activities
which traditionally drain the largest parts of the
state budget. MoNRE’s perception, on the other
hand, was that “the function of state management
of water resources has been handed over from
MARD to MoNRE” (Trang 2005; Cong 2007).
Other arguments in this turf battle referred to
the respective weaknesses of the two ministries.
MARD, on the one hand, was decried as being
narrowly focused on irrigation and flood issues,
heavily biased towards structural and engineering
approaches (Nghia 2004a), and its involvement in
regulation issues were contrary to the principle of
separation of power between regulation and
operation. MoNRE, on the other hand, was held as
being technically weak (especially at the provincial
level, with its incipient departments: DoNRE),
without the competence needed to monitor and
regulate water allocation, water quality, and
environmental changes altogether.
At the peak of these debates, in June 2003, a
task force including representatives from MARD,
MoNRE and several donors published its
recommendations to solve the gridlock between the
two ministries in a report titled “Transition of Water
Resource Management from MARD to MoNRE”
(GoV 2003b). Integrated planning (basin master
plans) and operational management was left to
MARD, with its RBOs and line agencies. Although
the report advocated a transfer of the responsibility
for supporting RBOs from IWARP to DWRM, the
“degree to which a planning capability is built up in
MoNRE or whether the IWARP or part of it is
transferred” was left unspecified (GoV 2003b).
In late 2004, the government requested
MoNRE (in coordination with MARD) to prepare a
government decree on RBM (CRDE and IESD
2006) that would, in particular, modify Government
Decree 86/2003 and “remove the function of
coordinating river basin management of MARD”
(Hydrosult and Arcadis 2005). MoNRE, in turn,
requested and received support from ADB and
DANIDA to draft the decree. In March 2005, the
draft of the Decree on “River Basin Management”
challenged MARD’s “ownership” of management at
the basin level (GoV 2005). MoNRE is to lead the
appraisal of a ten-year river basin plan (which “sets
the broad objectives, policies and priorities on water
resources protection, exploitation, development and
utilization and protection of water-related
environment in the basin”), seek comments from
NWRC, and submit final appraisals to the prime
minister. The decree also dramatically reshuffled
responsibilities by introducing advisory River Basin
Councils, shifting decision-power to MoNRE, and
limiting MARD to performing actions defined and
monitored by MoNRE.
Competing Strategies
In April 2006, MoNRE tried to re-establish
ownership of the policy process and published a
“National Water Resources Strategy towards the
year 2020” (MoNRE 2006), which acknowledges
that “The Law on Water Resources… has not been6
effectively applied and is now not suitable to deal
with new situations.” It re-asserts the principles of
IWRM, notably the separation of functions
(regulation and operation), integrated RBM,
licensing of water use and discharge, and the
protection, efficient exploitation and sustainable
development of water resources. It entrusts MoNRE
with the task of establishing “river basin plans and
water resources plans for all regions and managing
the implementation of the plans” and calls for a
review and amendment of the Law on Water
Resources.
1
This strategy re-asserts the prime importance
of river basin planning and management as a layer
of decision-making that both clearly rests with
MoNRE and defines the conditions under which
operational agencies will have to perform their
tasks and duties. This view was, unsurprisingly,
not shared by MARD which issued its own Strategy
for sustainable national water resources
management and development (MARD 2006a). The
MARD strategy recapitulates past public
investments in water resource development in
different regions, the achievements in terms of
irrigation, drainage and flood control, the staffing of
water services, and reviews all the projected water
demand and investment needs for each region. The
focus is clearly on the conventional management of
supply in order to respond to new and growing
needs, including the requirements induced by
cities, industries, tourism, aquaculture, salt
production, or agricultural diversification, and the
necessity to ensure environmental flows (or at least
minimum flows to downstream areas). This is what
distinguishes the new approach from earlier
planning studies that “were mainly implemented to
meet development requirements of the agricultural
sector” (MARD 2006a). The strategy markedly
differs from the strategy of MoNRE and does little
to enlarge the scope of MARD beyond its
traditional role.
After all, this could be good news. If MARD’s
role is about structural development and operation
of waterworks, why would it conflict with MoNRE,
which conceives of management at a higher level,
with more consideration to environmental health?
Both also agree with the necessity to reason water
resource development and management at the
basin level. As discussed later, the conflict revolves
around the decision-making power on planning,
what is to be done or not, and the implications in
terms of budget flows within the bureaucracies.
In the face of such recurring contradictions,
Standing Prime Minister Nguyen Sinh Hung
convened a meeting on March 5, 2007 to hear the
opinion of ministers from MARD and MoNRE. The
Notice 43/2007/TB-VPCP on the conclusion of that
meeting (GoV 2007) confirmed the intention of
transferring basin planning to the latter and
requested MoNRE to prepare a new draft decree on
RBM and modifications of decrees 86/2003/ND-CP
and 91/2002/ND-CP.
Internal Tensions within MARD and
MoNRE
If the lack of institutional clarity severely affected
the two ministries and their relationships, it also
impacted the distribution of roles and duties within
each of the two ministries. The responsibility for
RBM was first entrusted to the IWARP of MARD
because of the 1998 Law on Water Resources
(see Figure 2). While in 2003 the IWARP, in its
capacity as the Office of the RRBO, had been
selected as the Implementing Agency (IA) of the
orientation phase of the 2RRBSP, the (second)
design phase of the project saw the DWR insisting
on playing this role, arguing that the IWARP as a
(technical) planning institute devoid of state
management functions could not play such a role.
This move may suggest a desire to keep control of
1 The strategy also includes conventional orthodox views of a change in “water management from a subsidized, supply-focused
approach into a demand-focused approach that recognizes the commercial nature of water service products,” emphasizes pricing,
cost recovery and even trading of entitlements in a market, but does little to underline the intrinsic necessity of hard choices and
trade-offs in water management, sticking to a depoliticized and non-conflicting view of IWRM.7
the fringe benefits associated with projects but also
a more profound concern for a possible dilution of
decision power over infrastructural planning.
This reaffirmation of the power of the DWR had
also been paralleled by a claim to relocate RBOs
under the DWR. However, since the department’s
main duty was to manage dams, sluices and
pumps – often through the intermediary of semi-
independent companies – the justification for such
a move would be quite weak and would overtly
come into conflict with the principle of separation
of duties.
FIGURE 2. Schematic summary of main government organizations involved.
MoNRE was also affected by the unclear
definition of the mandates of its different
departments. Because it was mainly created from
an aggregation of various departments and
agencies of existing ministries and agencies,
water quality fell under the responsibility of
both the DWRM and the Vietnam Environment
Protection Agency (VEPA). However, the
conflict between these two departments has been
limited, possibly because the functions of
both departments have not been fully
implemented yet.
Integrated Water Resources Management in the Red River Basin:
Starting a Process
The First Red River Basin Organization
The Red River is the second largest river in
Vietnam. It is an international river that originates
in China and traverses Vietnam before emptying
into the East Sea. Administratively, the Red River
Basin covers or overlaps 26 provinces and its
population totals 28 million (in 2002), including
Hanoi, the capital city. It supports a large irrigated
area (650,000 hectares (ha), mostly in the delta)
and is subject to recurrent problems of flooding.
Not surprisingly, the basin was given priority in the
process of establishing RBOs in the country.
During the final phase of the passing of the
new Law on Water Resources,
2 the ADB
approached the Vietnamese Government and
proposed a three-year (1998-2000) TA (Technical
Assistance) titled “Red River Basin Water Resource
Management Project” which, according to Wright
(1999), would “assist the government to establish
a ‘river basin commission’ for the Red River Basin,
to manage the planning of water resource
2 According to Wright (1999) “The government has requested the Asian Development Bank to provide support for improving water
resources management in the Red River Basin, in view of its importance to the national economy.”8
management and facilitate improved stakeholder
involvement and agency coordination in the
process”. Other goals included improved
coordination between provinces, capacity building,
the establishment of the Red River Basin
Resources Data Directory, and the writing of a
“basin profile”. Re-affirming that the strong “legal
backing” of the law sets the stage for RBM, the TA
tried to set things in motion.
On April 9, 2001, the MARD created the Red-
Thai Binh River Basin Planning Management Board
(more simply RRBO). In the same year, another
ADB TA (3528-VIE) was started and dedicated to
capacity building for water resource management
including three sub-projects, the first of which was
meant to build the capacity of the NWRC and the
incipient RBOs through study tours, awareness
raising workshops, assistance in drafting official
documents, and by “carrying out activities to
expose key people to the meaning and benefits of
IWRM” (ADB 2001b).
Although MARD had agreed to the
establishment of the NWRC and the RBOs, which
remained under its full control, its lack of interest
was manifest. After a few initial meetings in 2000,
the NWRC did not meet for nearly two years. The
lack of funding, office facilities, and operational
guidelines for the RRBO, were held as the main
constraints to proper data management and
communication, and to field investigations of the
current status of the basin (Nghia 2004b).
In 2001, another TA (the 2RRBSP) funded by
the ADB and the Governments of the Netherlands
and France was signed but its inception workshop
was only held two years later, in October 2003.
Seven percent of this US$156 million project was
targeted for capacity building for the RRBO, public
awareness, and a pilot water licensing and
wastewater discharge permit system (in the Cau
River). Although the 2RRBSP was initially designed
as a two-phase project (design and implementation)
it was decided to start with an initial orientation
phase that would clarify the issues at stake and
their perception by, and level of priority for,
stakeholders in the basin’s provinces (Shearwater
2003). During the second half of 2003, the Office of
the RRBO organized 25 workshops involving key
staff from water relevant sectors and decision-
makers from the 26 provinces intersecting the Red
River Basin. Three top priority issues with regard to
water resource management in the entire Red River
Basin emerged from these workshops: 1) irrigated
agriculture; 2) water supply and sanitation combined
with pollution; and 3) flood control together with
reforestation and protection (Nghia 2004a).
The operation regulation of the first three RBOs
(including the RRBO) was specified by a
ministerial decision in April 2004 (MARD 2004).
The role of the RBOs is unambiguously to serve as
technical coordinating and advisory bodies to
MARD, “assessing planning alternatives, basic
investigation projects, inventory and assessment of
water resources in the river basin; [and] submitting
follow-up recommendations and proposals to
MARD and authorized state agencies.”- Other
missions include data exchange and management,
coordination with other ministries and agencies,
capacity building, and awareness raising. RBOs
are to meet twice a year, and are chaired by a
Vice Minister of MARD, assisted by the General
Director of the DWR and a department level leader
of MoNRE. Members include leaders of PPCs from
provinces located in the basin, leaders of DWR,
IWARP, DWRM, and other water-related
departments from other ministries as well as their
provincial affiliates.
Phase I of the 2RRBSP served as a screening
process which made it clear that the 25 provinces
have a few issues in common (aside from those
already taken care of, such as flood or dam
operations) and that IWRM should be implemented
to tackle actual problems at a lower scale. It was
also hoped that the institutional conflict around the
role of RBOs would be minimized when moving to
a lower scale where agreements and arrangements
among smaller groups would perhaps be easier.
The Cau and the Day River sub-basins emerged as
strong candidates for pilot testing RBM. In October
2004, phase II of the project started with five
different components, addressing: IWRM in the Cau
River Sub-basin, strategic flood management in the
Red River Delta, IWRM at sub-basin level in
selected upland provinces, IWRM in the Day-Nhue
River Sub-basin (focused on water quality issues),
and support to the Office of the RRBO (2RRBSP
2006).9
The Cau Sub-RBO
As early as 1997, and, therefore, long before talks
about RBOs began, the six provinces traversed by
the Cau River (Figure 3) decided to jointly tackle
the issue of water pollution in the basin. It resulted
in the formulation of a Master plan on
Environmental and Landscape Protection and the
government subsequently gave the green light to
the creation of a Cau River Committee chaired by
the PPC’s chairmen. This initiative was undertaken
by the then provincial departments of the Ministry
of Science and Technology, under the Environment
Programme, but did not catch the interest of the
RRBO when this was later established (CRDE and
IESD 2006).
In May 2006, MARD established the Cau Sub-
Basin Organization (CSBO) as an advisory body
FIGURE 3. Location of six provinces in the Cau River Basin. Source: 2RRBSP (2006).10
under direct control of the RRBO chaired by
MARD. The CSBO is to be chaired permanently by
the vice-chairmen of the Thai Nguyen PPC. In
September 2006, the RRBO issued Decision No.
7 that defined the “Organization and Working
Regulation for the Cau River Sub-basin
Organization”. The CSBO, located within the
DARD, appears to be a mere appendix of the
RRBO, with the main task of advising the RRBO
in water resource assessments, planning options,
monitoring of implementation, and definition of
priorities (MARD 2006b). This Decision was passed
rather hastily, so that phase III of the 2RRBSP
would not be delayed further, and involved limited
deliberation on the degree of autonomy of the
CSBO and its relationship with line agencies.
As mentioned above, the Cau River Basin was
selected because it presented a “real IWRM
challenge” (ADB 2006) identified during the initial
stages of phase II of the 2RRBSP. These
challenges include water scarcity shared among
the four lower provinces and conflicts in allocating
the water of the Nui Coc Reservoir, which is used
for a) irrigation, b) supplying water to Thai Nguyen
City, c) diluting pollution in the Cau River, and d)
supporting recreational and tourist uses in the
reservoir itself. The project, thus, included several
components that looked at varied issues such as
water balance, storage potential, irrigation
performance in the Song Cau system, aquaculture
potential and crop diversification.
However conventional they may appear, these
issues proved to be more intractable than expected
and studies were hindered by the lack of data on
water flows and land use, and the limited time and
means available to carry out extensive fieldwork.
Pollution issues were also not fully captured
because of patchy data and an inadequate
regulation framework. The polluter-pays principle
enshrined in the Law on Water Resources clearly
appeared insufficient to solve the problems, not only
because of confusion over standard definitions and
with monitoring but also due to inadequate
enforcement capacity. Most polluting factories in
the area are State enterprises, allegedly old and
inefficient, which would be bankrupt overnight if
they had to treat their effluents. This contributes to
explaining why the effective definition and
implementation of allocation rules, water quality
monitoring, improvement of irrigation management
or reservoir operation were left to phase III of the
project which is due to start in early 2007.
The objectives of the Cau River component of
phase III of the 2RRBSP included technical issues
and governance (Shearwater 2007): Assess
pollution emissions and associated environmental
health impacts/risks; provide assessment of
options; facilitate informed inclusive decision-
making; support implementation by PPCs of agreed
IWRM activities; assist in the periodic review of the
mandate and structure of the CSBO; and help build
its capacity. So far, the CSBO is heavily dominated
by the Thai Nguyen Province and this might prove
to be a weakness for solving inter-provincial issues.
The strong subordination of the CSBO to the
central level of MARD, through the RRBO, is also
likely to annihilate any sense of ownership by the
provinces concerned. While ADB’s TA sees the
active participation of the CSBO and other
stakeholders in the sub-basin as essential in the
resolution of problems, it is not clear who is going
to participate and how.
Other issues are linked to the conflict in duties
at the ministerial level. With the establishment of
the CSBO, the existing Environmental Committee,
for example, should ideally merge with the CSBO
and incorporate its environmental master plan with
the general plan for the basin in the future. This
has not happened but the CSBO should include
three staff from provincial DoNRE for environmental
issues, two from DARD for irrigation and one with
a NGO background for participatory irrigation
policies. The Cau River Basin does face problems
of water allocation, pollution control and inter-
provincial coordination. Whether these problems
call for a Sub-RBO (S-RBO) with a permanent role
or not is unsure. The fact that provinces have not
been able to solve coordination problems in the
past might indicate a need for some kind of
intervention by the central government, at least to
enable, and assist in, resolution mechanisms. But
such an intervention may also meet with the
passivity of provinces that feel subjected to central
power.11
The Day Sub-RBO
In 2003, following the example of the Cau River, the
six chairmen of the PPCs concerned with the Day
River met in an attempt to solve water quality and
environmental problems in the basin. The Day River
branches off the Red River upstream of Hanoi
capital, although this natural connection was later
sealed, transforming the river into the receptacle of
Hanoi’s main drain, the Nhue River (Figure 4). The
Nhue and the Day rivers are, thus, the most
polluted waterways in Northern Vietnam. Domestic
and industrial pollution combines with
agrochemicals used in agriculture. One of the
polders traversed by these rivers (the Bac Nam Ha
polder) is also subject to water shortages during
the winter-spring crop season. A gate is, therefore,
under construction at the head of the river in order
to allow approximately 30-40 cubic meters per
second (m
3/s) of water to be transferred from the
Red River into the Day River.
Planning and Investment of the provinces, DARD,
DoNRE, Department of Science and Technology,
etc., totaling 60 persons. The regulation for the
DSBO was approved in September 2006.
A legitimate question is, what is the added
value of the DSBO, compared with the earlier inter-
provincial committee? Is there a need to create
new and permanent offices or would a more
informal mechanism be sufficient? Officers in the
DSBO reported several advantages of the new
setting: First, the DSBO is officially recognized and
carries more weight when requesting interventions
such as the opening of the head reach of the Day
River. Second, it allows coordination of actions and
decisions. For example, the ban on floating
vegetables (which obstructs the flow of water) in
one province would be circumvented by people
growing them in other provinces, if the interdiction
was not taken jointly. Third, the DSBO offers better
opportunities for officers from each province to be
aware of what the other provinces plan in terms of
The Day Sub-Basin Organization (DSBO) was
officially set up in December 2005. As with the
CSBO, the chair is rotated (every two years)
among the chairs/vice-chairs of the six PPCs
concerned. Members include the Department of
FIGURE 4. Location of the Day River Basin. Source: 2RRBSP (2006).
water management structures (e.g., gates or flood
control structures) and, thus, to anticipate and flag
possible impacts on their own province.
The DSBO also illustrates the limited power of
provincial offices vis-à-vis the central ministries.12
Since the Bac Nam Ha polder overlaps with several
provinces, the Bac Nam Ha Irrigation Company
comes under the direct jurisdiction of MARD. Local
provincial officers resent the lack of decision power
that prevents them from defining their own priorities.
Yet, at the moment, the actions proposed by the
DSBO for 2007 look more like a wish list and still
carry little weight; and rules for decision-making
and joint deliberation are yet to be defined.
The main problem for the river continues to be
pollution caused mainly by Hanoi. Obviously, the
improvement of water disposal and treatment in the
capital depends on the establishment of
regulations and their enforcement but, more
crucially, on the financial resources that the state
decides to devote to solving the problem (building
treatment stations, upgrading obsolete industrial
units, etc.). Although the DSBO may contribute to
stressing the urgency of such actions, its clout is
probably marginal at the moment. It is, thus, a
legitimate question to ask whether water quality
management demands an integrated inter-sectoral
approach requiring the formation of a permanent S-
RBO or if it is primarily a question of investment in
treatment facilities around the Hanoi capital (and
the decision to mobilize huge public funds to
tackle water pollution problems).
Who Wants RBOs? Reformulating the
Project
With all these plans for phase III under discussion,
the project suddenly took an abrupt change of
direction. The ADB and the Embassy of the
Netherlands cancelled two of the four components
planned for component A of the project. The Cau
component was cancelled because of MARD’s
delay in defining an operating budget and
appointing staff for the CSBO, lack of demand by
provinces, and lasting confusion on whether
responsibility for integrated RBM would eventually
rest with MARD or MoNRE. The Day component
is going to be carried out by MoNRE,
independently of the DSBO and chaired by MARD
which, again, stands in total contradiction with the
idea of IWRM, as expressed by RBOs.
On 24 May 2007, the Office of the Government
informed that the issue of transferring
responsibilities from MARD to MoNRE would only
be resolved as part of a wider process of reducing
the number of ministries and rationalizing their
mandates/functions. At the same time, the
Ministry of Finance recommended abolition of
irrigation service fees, signaling that major policy
shifts might be on the way.
Analysis and Lessons Learned
The RRBO: A Blueprint or an
Endogenous Solution?
The earlier chronology of reforms and ADB TAs
showed that the relevance of RBOs in general,
3
and of the RRBO in particular, was largely
un-questioned and allegedly anchored in provisions
of the Law on Water Resources: Beyond capacity
building for the RRBO and public awareness and
education programs for water resource
management, the project’s pilot water licensing
and wastewater discharge permit systems would
demonstrate the benefits of IWRM. Project
consultants found themselves in a situation where
the RRBO would have to be trained without having
first asserted its legitimacy with regard to the
ministries concerned and to the provinces. They
were also unsure of what the main issues were that
the RRBO would have to address, aside from water
quality in the Cau and Day rivers. As mentioned
3 “RBOs need to be formed in major river basins“ (ADB 2001a).13
earlier, a first and quite successful Diagnostic and
Orientation phase allowed to scope out what the
perceptions of line agencies and provincial
representatives were regarding water challenges in
the Red River Basin.
Phase I of the project found that the Red River
Basin is not short of water and “demonstrated that
basin-wide participation is both difficult and
unnecessary as the 26 provinces and 25 million
people do not share common IWRM challenges”
(Shearwater 2005). This timely realization helped
put the project on a new track and the focus
shifted from conventional basin master planning to
“doing a few important water management things
well,” and from the whole river basin to the sub-
basin level. At this stage, the risk arose that
IWRM might appear as a solution looking for a
problem and ADB expressed its concern that the
participants of the initial phase “hadn’t identified a
‘real’ IWRM issue” (Shearwater 2005). The issue of
allocation of water from the Nui Coc Reservoir was
singled out as an IWRM challenge that combined
issues of water quality and allocation, and
concerned two or three provinces.
This reformulation of the project raises some
more general questions on the nature of the policy
process. It suggests that the weight of external
actors in this process, particularly development
banks and bilateral cooperation agencies, is quite
significant, prompting two different questions: 1)
are the concepts put forward, proposed or
sometimes imposed, relevant to the problems
experienced in Vietnam? and 2) if these concepts
are sound, is their introduction timely and
consistent with the actual bureaucratic and political
configuration in the country?
It is apparent that many of the driving
concepts pushed forward heavily draw on “best
practices” supposedly sanctioned at the
international level. RBM, for example, is introduced
as “an internationally accepted approach providing
the required levels of stakeholder involvement in
water resource management decisions, and
coordination across the many government agencies
with responsibilities and functions in the water
sector in a large river basin” (Wright 1999).
Similarly, there is intense and repeated borrowing
from overarching consensual concepts like
sustainable development, IWRM, or participatory
management that tend to sound hollow when
decontextualized. The Law on Water Resources,
for example, although it was soon to appear to be
obsolete
4 in the wake of the establishment of
MoNRE and RBOs, was presented as providing “a
modern, dynamic, and realistic legal framework in
accordance with current international principles”
(MARD and DANIDA 2000). This discourse
percolated into national policy documents
5 but
often sounded more like a rhetorical concession
rather than a reflection of a change in mind-sets.
6
Although there are incentives for national decision-
makers, as well as for international consultants,
7 to
rely heavily on these general concepts, they run
the risk of generating proposals that will later – if
implemented – find themselves at odds with reality.
The nature of short-term projects and TAs, with
rigid – and frequently unrealistic - time frames and
disbursement schedules, also contributes to
creating such situations. For example, the initial
drive to distil principles of IWRM and RBM for the
Red River foundered on its later confrontation with
reality, with a shift towards sub-basin issues.
4 MoNRE (2006) admitted that “the Law on Water Resources has not really penetrated into our lives, has not been effectively
applied and is now not suitable to deal with new situations.”
5 For example, the National Water Resources Council website states that “The Law on Water Resources has reflected almost worldwide
concepts and principles on integrated water resources management” (NWRC 2007).
6 Integrated use of the water resource is mentioned only twice in the 1998 Law on Water Resources and is defined as “making
rational use of, and developing the potential of, a water source and limiting the negative effect of water for integrated service of
many purposes.” IWRM is now said to be the topmost priority of MARD (Su et al. 2004).
7 National decision-makers understand that a degree of acceptance of these concepts (irrespective of whether they believe in them)
is the oil that lubricates relationships with donors and the international level; experts and consultants, who often have very little
time to do project feasibility studies, also ground a part of their legitimacy in the manipulation of these concepts whose hegemonic
nature provides a degree of protection against criticism, unless or until completely discredited.14
It may also be the case that concepts are
applied or proposed in an untimely fashion.
Management regimes require bureaucratic
configurations, legal frameworks and governance
patterns that are consistent with these regimes.
Pushing for a particular regime when these
conditions are not met may just be wishful thinking
with little chance of success. The first Red River
Basin Water Resource Management Project was
planned to assist the government in establishing a
“river basin commission” for the Red River Basin to
manage the planning of water resource
management and facilitate improved stakeholder
involvement and agency coordination in the
process” (Wright 1999). These intentions, with
hindsight, conflict with the fact that the RRBO was
to be set up under the control of MARD and basin
planning, notably water infrastructure development,
would remain its prerogative. In that sense, the
institutional setting was not suitable, and probably
adverse, to the implementation of IWRM principles,
in general, and RBOs, in particular. This
contradiction, that was to be made explicit later by
the creation of MoNRE and by its very claim to a
division of roles and responsibilities, was also
painfully clear to consultants of the Red River
Basin Water Resource Management Project (see
for example, Taylor and Wright 2001). Yet, such
evidence did not warrant an early reconsideration or
a revision of the project.
A similar disjuncture between intended goals
and reality was apparent in DANIDA’s 2000-2005
program aimed at supporting the implementation of
the Law on Water Resources. The program stated
that the Law “provides a modern, dynamic, and
realistic legal framework… [and] defines new
responsibilities and functions which have potential
to bring water resource management in Vietnam in
line with proven international principles and
practices” (MARD and DANIDA 2000). Yet, the
same document reports that much concern has
been raised over the dual role of MARD as both
custodian of national resources and providers of
services (irrigation, drainage, flood control, etc.).
Such undesirable contradictions, although well-
recognized by consultants, dictated compromise
and half-way solutions. Other analysts also note
that officials have only had a few opportunities to
discuss or learn about new concepts and this
has “created unnecessary disputes” (CRDE and
IESD 2006).
Vertical and Sectoral Integration
Core aspects of IWRM include integration of water
management, the coordination of actions, but also
the distribution of decision-making power, across:
• the legislative power, represented by the
National Assembly at the central level and the
People’s Councils at lower (province or city
equivalent to province, district and commune)
levels;
• the executive power exercised by the central
government and three nested parallel levels of
PPCs at province (or city), district and
commune levels that are elected by the
corresponding Councils; and
• the ministries and line agencies at the central
government level, with their representative
departments at the province and district, or
sometimes, communal levels, that are
administratively under the PPCs.
These nested levels must be integrated
vertically but also horizontally: for example,
provinces need to collaborate to tackle the issues
they have in common; while within the same
province (just as at the ministerial level) line
agencies must also harmonize their actions.
With specific problems identified at the sub-
basin level, institutional concerns shifted to
establishing S-RBOs and defining their role and
position vis-à-vis the Red River parent organization.
The role of the RRBO itself, for lack of major
issues that would justify its existence, was
redefined as one of supporting S-RBOs, since it
also became clear that these new organizations
would not have the technical capacity to address
inter-provincial issues; the position of MoNRE, in
particular, appeared to be very weak because it
could only count with a recently established
DoNRE, unqualified staff, and no data collection
network that could give an idea of what the
situation was.15
Under present arrangements, the S-RBO is,
therefore, subject to several lines of control and
accountability, as sketched out in Figure 5. The S-
RBO is first strongly under the control of MARD,
because it is an appendix of the RRBO, and also
because of the central contribution of DARD to its
staff. But it is also partly controlled by PPCs, first,
because they chair it, and, second, because the
heads of the provincial departments that staff it are
reputed to be more accountable to their provincial
leaders than to their ministries.
The role of the S-RBO remains advisory but it
clearly created a space in the governance structure
which could offer opportunities for shifts in the
distribution of power. At the moment, both the
MARD and the provinces are somehow worried
about the possible emergence of an intermediate
level of decision-making; MARD is concerned by a
dilution of its power to plan infrastructural
development, while provinces are concerned by the
transfer of powers from the provinces to an inter-
provincial body with discretionary and overriding
power (CRDE and IESD 2006).
It may well be that the current status quo
includes a tacit shared preference for keeping S-
RBOs with limited power. Yet, as it stands, the S-
RBO also constitutes a window of opportunity for
provinces to assert a larger independence from the
central government. In that, they may benefit from
the dynamics of the 2RRBSP which tends to
promote the ownership of the S-RBO by the
provinces. This application of the principle of
subsidiarity (RBOs should be governed by their
own constituents), however, may not entirely fit the
prevailing situation. Although provinces have state
management functions within their boundaries, it is
clear that such a definition is unsatisfactory
because many interventions in the water cycle do
have an impact on downstream or other areas.
Problems that clearly travel across provinces are
supposed to be handled by MARD or by other
relevant ministries. It is not clear whether this way
of internalizing externalities, by going one level up
to the ministry, should be replaced by resorting to
a S-RBO at an intermediate level. If so, the
responsibilities of the S-RBO have to be defined
and there is potential for replicating at that level
the infighting that is currently occurring at the
ministerial level. The benefits of such a move are
also not very clear for the provinces themselves.
First, they are aware of their limited technical
capacity but they may also be concerned with the
access to central government subsidies since at
present most inter-provincial issues are, generally,
not only taken care of – but also funded – at the
national level.
FIGURE 5. Articulation of governance levels in the Red River Basin.16
The eventual cancellation of the Cau S-RBO
sub-component of the 2RRBSP may thus be a
reflection of the fact that without clear redistribution
of bureaucratic power and responsibilities the
status quo is the option that is likely to prevail.
RBOs might be accepted – or tolerated – as long
as they are associated with TAs, projects and
benefits from external funding, and as long as they
are kept under the control of MARD; but their
durability is dubious as soon as this support
wanes.
Separation of Power … Without Power
Shift
It has become a standard policy recommendation
of “modern water management arrangements” to
separate the roles of water resources manager and
operators as much as possible, so that powerful
line agencies in charge of hydropower or irrigation,
to name the most obvious, do not pursue sectoral
(over)development, with little consideration for
economic soundness or social/environmental
impacts. (Wright 1999; Millington 2000; Arriens
2004). While the manager ensures regulation of the
water sector (by setting standards, allocating and
monitoring water use, establishing environmental
protection rules, coordinating planning, etc.), the
operator takes care of structures or reservoirs
according to the rules set. The regulation functions
are best decentralized to the river basin level and
encapsulated in a RBO. Above these two levels,
apex bodies, in the form of inter-ministerial
councils that meet two or three times a year, are
also expected to give overall policy guidance and
review adequate legislations.
When the regulation and operating roles are
held by the same ministry (MARD) separating
these roles means that substantial decision-
making power will have to be shifted from that
ministry to the (new) regulating body (MoNRE, in
the present case). Therefore, such a shift requires
the new distribution of roles and duties to be
reflected in new legislation (formal level) but also to
buildup a regulator endowed with sufficient human
power and technical expertise (practical level).
Designing new formal rules without simultaneously
reshaping the distribution of power that underlies
prior institutional arrangements is unlikely to be
effective (Evans 2004).
The wording of the decisions on RBOs has,
therefore, been the object of much scrutiny and
debate, both “within the bureaucracy and among
associated experts in Vietnam” (Taylor and Wright
2001). At the time the profile of the RRBO was
being outlined, it was clear, in particular, that the
RRBO should be a coordinating agency “which
could not adopt any state management power or
function”. If it did, this would conflict with the
powers of the MARD and other agencies. It is safe
to assume that MARD accepted the idea of setting
RBOs after making sure that it would not threaten
its established role and that it would be confined
to a coordinating role. Since MoNRE had not been
created at the time of establishing the first three
RBPMBs in 2001, these were set up under MARD.
The challenge only emerged with the setting up
of MoNRE, which claimed the river basin level as
the scale where it should exercise its state
management function. The contradiction between
the very role of MoNRE and its lack of power over
RBM is obvious, as stressed in the preceding
section.
If we compare official mandates, strategies,
work plans and actual activities of MARD and
MoNRE, especially in their claim to manage water
at the basin level, it is clear that the overlapping is
limited to a few issues. The core of the conflict is
eventually quite circumscribed and lies with
planning.
Who Holds the Rubber Stamp?
It is apparent from MARD’s documents that its
main concern remains focused on structural
issues, on matching demand and supply, and on
flood control and mitigation. MARD remains very
much engineering-oriented and one may wonder
why it would strive to control regulatory issues
such as the allocation of permits, the definition of
dam rule curves, pollution standards and control of
effluents, or the identification and protection of
wetlands and other fragile ecosystems, even if
carried out at the basin level.17
Analysis of various documents and interviews
with officials suggest that the Gordian knot lies
with planning, taken in the old sense of identifying
structural interventions that will allow the increased
use of water or a better protection from floods and
droughts. In continuous planning, and subsequent
construction activities, lies the professional
gratification of planners and technicians and resides
the assurance of sustained budgets. Sustained
budgets, especially in a context where both design
and construction work are increasingly outsourced,
open the way for people with decision-making
power to benefit from investment flows. With
structural investments constituting 64% of the
MARD’s budget, the stakes are high since
realignment of decisional power necessarily entails
a redistribution of benefits. In 2006, the total
budget of MARD was US$200 million of which
US$126 million was allocated to investment for
development.
Since RBOs are potentially endowed with the
power to draw basin plans and, possibly, to screen
these plans before final approval, it is not surprising
to observe a dual strategy of a) maintaining RBOs
as symbolic advisory bodies with reduced
autonomous technical capacity; and b) controlling
RBOs in case their screening power would be
strengthened. Furthermore, since RBOs are largely
promoted by foreign partners and are, thus, likely
to be associated with the future delivery of loans
and projects, they may also ‘attract’ more
investments, which makes their control even more
desirable. In other words, the legitimacy of RBOs
as ‘registration chambers’ for projects – rubber-
stamped with the seal of IWRM – can be attractive
for the departments traditionally involved in
structural interventions.
While Decree 91/2002/ND-CP, that established
MoNRE as the manager of water resources, did not
address the crucial point of infrastructural planning,
the 2005 draft Decree on Integrated River Basin
Management (see section, MARD versus MoNRE:
Turf Battle over Roles, above) included
“development and implementation of the river basin
plans” and entrusted it to MoNRE (GoV 2005).
8
This may help explain why the decree remained in
a draft form.
A Narrow Definition of Participation
Emphasis on participation has become a major
feature of development projects, in general, and of
ADB’s policy, in particular (ADB 2000; Molle 2005).
Since the early involvement of foreign and
multilateral donors, particularly in Northern
Vietnam, participatory approaches have been
central to water projects. In 1999, for example,
Wright (1999) announced that “a major feature of
the proposed RRBO is that it will provide a forum
for all major stakeholders to discuss, negotiate and
agree upon recommendations for planning
decisions to be submitted to the government…
irrigators will have an increased say in planning
decisions which impact on their sub-sector”.
IWRM, too, is supposed to incorporate a healthy
dose of participation from stakeholders. The
concept is based on “an expectation that
interested groups and organizations will coordinate
and participate directly as far as possible” (Taylor
and Wright 2001).
The Law on Water Resources, however, is
parsimonious with regard to participation (Molle
2005). It contains 71 occurrences of “State,” 49
occurrences of “Government,” but none of
“participation” or “participatory.” This can, perhaps,
be attributed to the particular conception that
people are effectively represented by local people’s
committees and other official organizations.
Although it may appear as a way to sideline civil
society, such a conception is also genuinely
ingrained in local political discourse and culture; in
that sense, participation strangely resonates with
socialist ideology and the notion of “civil society”
may seem redundant. It is abundantly clear from
official documents that the statement: “involvement
8 It is worth noting that in a properly set up regulatory and oversight body, the need for implementation should not arise with respect
to that body. One of the intentions of a split responsibility model is precisely to constrain un-warranted investment and infrastructure
development through rational planning and allocation of resources.18
of stakeholders is important for integrated water
resources management” (Lai 2002), refers to the
involvement of all ministries and provinces
concerned.
Likewise, ADB’s consultants continue to put
emphasis on participation (Sach 2004) and to use
the term ‘stakeholder’, while (implicitly)
understanding it as the people’s committees, at
the provincial level and below. Their main hope is
to support a process whereby local stakeholders
(mostly provincial authorities) would contribute to
the elaboration of priority issues in IWRM, to
identify and assess a wide range of options to
address these issues, and to select preferred
options for IWRM (Shearwater, 2004).
Regarding non-governmental organizations
(NGOs), Taylor and Wright (2001) reckon that there
are a few groups in Vietnam that could easily
participate in a consultative role and, although
NGOs do exist, they “would not be considered
eligible to take a formal role in an RBO”. In August
2003, the ADB wrote to MARD requesting advice
regarding an appropriate mechanism for involving
NGOs in IWRM under Part A (Shearwater 2004).
MARD agreed to consider a proposal for NGO
involvement but it seems that this did not arouse
particular interest from the NGO Resource Center
or from individual NGOs. Thus, whether out of lack
of interest, preparedness or political space, NGOs
are marginally represented, if at all, and
participation – although ubiquitous at a rhetorical
level – remains a concept that applies to the
relative contributions and distribution of decision-
making power between administrative levels.
The Power of Words
Words, and their meanings, are resources in policy
debates. General, ill-defined, or terms with more
than one meaning may be appropriated and used
strategically by different parties. Translations, in
the present case between English and
Vietnamese, also offer some opportunity for
hijacking terms as well as being a fertile ground for
confusion.
In the past, many Vietnamese as well as
government authorities considered the words thuy
loi, derived from a Chinese term for water
resources, as equivalent to irrigation (or thuy nong
in Vietnamese, i.e., water use for agriculture). This
was partly due to irrigation being the most
important water use in Vietnam. Since the early
1990s MARD stressed that thuy loi should be
translated as water resources, not irrigation, as a
means of bolstering its legitimacy for water
resource management. MoNRE, consequently,
avoids using the term thuy loi and prefers tai
nguyen nuoc, a more literal term introduced by the
Law on Water Resources to designate water
resources (CRDE and IESD 2006).
Another important semantic feature is the term
used for ‘organization’ when talking of RBOs. The
Law on Water Resources first talked of “agencies
managing the planning of the river basin”. Agency
(co quan in Vietnamese), is a general term for
government bodies or offices, except in a few
special cases such as the National Environmental
Agency (NEA) or VEPA. The use of a general
term, thus, left the RBOs rather unspecified. The
first three RBOs were subsequently referred to as
River Basin Planning Management Boards
(RBPMB), when they were established in 2001.
Boards or councils (hoi dong in Vietnamese) usually
make or orient decisions for specific functions but
do not implement these decisions. The RBPMB
were, thus, meant to be advisory and only take
general decisions. In 2004, the boards in the basin
started to be called ‘RBOs’. ‘Organization’ is
generally translated as to chuc, when used for
independent associations such as NGOs, but in
the case of the RBO it is translated as ban and is
meant to implement certain functions or actions
decided by a committee or boards. It signals that
RBOs are now construed as more than boards or
committees.
Translations from and to English also offer
opportunities for confusion, whether that is used
intentionally or not. Donors and consultants
constantly made the point that RBOs were
enshrined in the Law despite evidence that their
conception of such organizations was quite
distinct from that which had been defined. Some
words are also ambiguous: the English term
‘management’ may apply to an irrigation canal, a
dam, or an organization. Recently, the term has19
been used as an equivalent of ‘regulation’; the
water manager establishes the rules, may monitor
their application, and has the final say on planning
options, while day-to-day ‘management’ comes
under the word ‘operation’. A similar multi-
meaning word in Vietnamese is quan ly. It applies
to dam operation and supervision as well as to
regulation and the legal framework setting and is
part of the translation of ‘state management
function’. It also applies in ‘management of
planning’ (quan ly quy hoach) (supervision of the
execution in terms of activities, funding, etc.),
which is an unclear function linking management
and planning (quy hoach).
Conclusion and the Way Forward
particular) has been addressed at the central level
since the 1960s at least. Control of sediments also
requires action on land use practices in the upper
basin but this can be handled by nationwide
programs. Just like water quality problems, which
tend to affect sub-basins such as the Cau or the
Day, allocation issues are not too salient at the
basin level because of the relative abundance of
water and this tends to be more significant within
the polders or sub-basins like the Cau.
Yet, the emergence of the MoNRE in the
institutional landscape created conditions for
RBOs, once a concession to donors by MARD, to
become an object of internal struggle and as such
a valuable asset. For MoNRE, the river basin-level
was a new layer of administration it could
legitimately claim and that would allow the new
ministry to assert its role and authority amid
traditional administrative layers. RBOs opened a
political space for a possible reorganization of
responsibilities and reshuffling of power. Not
surprisingly, this prompted MARD to do its utmost
to keep control over RBOs resulting in a
confrontation – through antagonistic decrees and
strategies – between the two ministries.
It is thus the struggle for conserving both
autonomy in planning and the current procedures
of financial decision-making that is at the core of
inter-ministerial infighting. This is not an
uncommon situation as also illustrated in the case
of Thailand. Experience in other countries also
shows that with the decline of irrigation and
Water management problems at the basin level are
not new in the Red River Basin. As early as 1961,
a committee, the Hong (Red) River Committee was
formed to address issues of basin planning, floods,
and dam management. At that time, flood control,
either by dike or reservoirs, was the most
important objective. The office of the Committee
was placed under the then Ministry of Water
Resources with members from various ministries
and is considered to have been quite effective
(CRDE and IESD 2006). In contrast, the
establishment of the RRBO in 2001 owed a lot to
development banks and cooperation agencies who
promoted apex bodies, IWRM and RBOs. Due to
the lack of other acceptable options, but somewhat
inconsistently and in contradiction with its
mandate, the RRBO was set up under MARD, with
a few members of staff and a small budget, and
remained for three years without internal official
regulation.
The orientation phase of the 2RRBSP
undertook to convene authorities and technical
officials from relevant ministries and from the 25
provinces intersecting the basin to identify priority
issues; it found basin-wide participation “both
difficult and unnecessary”, leaving the RRBO with
little more than the role of overseeing its offspring
at the sub-basin level. The lack of relevance of a
RBO at the basin level that would coordinate
provincial actions does not mean that there are no
basin-wide issues. As noted earlier, flood
management (with respect to dam operation, in20
drainage works and dam construction and the
concomitant rise of environmental issues,
investments in both studies and infrastructure tend
to shift towards environmental studies and
treatment stations, with a corresponding shift in
money flows within the administration. This shift,
from MARD to MoNRE, does not occur without
friction and provides a good background for
explaining the present situation.
The confusion created begs for some clear-cut
arbitration. Several options have, and are, being
discussed. The first option, probably favored by
international partners, would be a clear revision or
amendment of decrees 91/2002 and 86/2003, a
transfer of the mandate for RBM and RBO from
MARD to MoNRE, accompanied by adequate
staffing and funding, and a revision of the Law on
Water Resources
9 to account for these changes.
Such a shift, however, would take time to
materialize at the provincial level where MARD is
likely to remain firmly dominant – and the reaction
of provinces would remain uncertain.
A second option is to shift the state function
of water resources management from MoNRE to
MARD to combine with other related functions of
MARD such as forest management and flood
control. An advantage of this option is the
availability of staff under MARD who have
experience in water resources planning. However,
this would ascribe overall management functions to
the MARD (agriculture, forestry and fisheries) which
is the largest water ‘user’, with little likelihood of
moving away from past problems of poor
management and over-exploitation, especially
because other water users are not well represented
in the existing RBOs (Cong 2007).
A third option would be MARD indirectly
reasserting control through the reformation of a
Ministry of Water Resources, in which MARD and
MoNRE would be merged. Proponents of this
option claim that integration should be done
through a concentration of all water-related issues
and powers under the same Ministry, allowing
sectoral conflicts to be internalized. This is a
common counterproposal of irrigation agencies
seeking to counter weakening of their power (as in
Thailand, for example); this, of course, would not
separate regulatory and operation functions and
would be a major setback for those who see the
actual confusion as the price to be paid for such
a separation.
10 (This option seems to have been
discarded in the definition of 22 new ministries in
July 2007).
A fourth option, perhaps, would be to address
the excess control of the center on basin issues
by devolving more power to RBOs and promoting
ownership of the provinces concerned. Yet,
provinces still do not have the technical capacity to
handle many technical issues and are financially
dependent on the center for large-scale and inter-
basin investments.
In 2008, the situation remains unclear. RBOs
are not mentioned in either of the new decrees
(GoV 2008a, 2008b) that specify the functions,
responsibility, authority and organizational
structure of MARD and MoNRE. In the decree
relative to MARD, only functions of management
of irrigation systems and disaster are indicated
while in the decree relative to MoNRE, only
functions of water resources management,
standing member of NWRC and National Mekong
Committee are mentioned. Instead, RBOs are the
subject of a decree drafted by MoNRE (on the
model of the 2005 decree) and posted on a
government website for public comments between
the end of 2007 and March 2008.
11 In this draft
9 A new ADB TA on “Review Law on Water Resources” is expected to be implemented during the period December 2008 to December
2009 to help the government review the current legal system applying to the water sector - including urban, rural, and river basin
water subsectors - and establish a statutory framework for IWRM principles in line with the objectives of the National Water Resources
Strategy (NWRS). DWRM is the implementing agency of this TA.
10 As stated by Biswas (2004), “The consolidation of institutions, in the name of integration, is likely to produce more centralization
and reduced responsiveness of such institutions to the needs of different stakeholders, which is not an objective that the current
societies and international institutions prefer at present.”
11 See www.chinhphu.vn/portal/page?_pageid=33,2091855&_dad=portal&_schema=PORTAL. Unlike other Decrees posted during
the same period, no public comment on this RBO draft Decree was given on this website.21
decree, unsurprisingly, MoNRE is to play a major
role in RBM and the structure of the RBOs
depends on the size (large, inter-provincial and
provincial) of the basin.
What lessons can be drawn from the
interactions between endogenous and exogenous
factors in the institutional process observed?
Despite the efforts deployed by several TAs,
attempts at grafting attributes of ‘modern’ water
policies in the Vietnamese bureaucratic
configuration were not very successful at first. This
was largely due to the lack of buy-in from
Vietnamese officials and the bundling of various
reforms with TAs. For example, NWRC’s
influence has been negligible and, after a few
meetings, the Council discontinued its activities
between 2001 and 2003; RBOs in the country
were supported by foreign partners and largely
ceased activities as soon as donor assistance
ended; and the Law on Water Resources, once
deemed a modern and solid basis for IWRM, was
soon candidate to revision. Some Vietnamese
officials feel that TAs were prepared by
international consultants without taking into
account the complexity of Vietnamese
institutional structure and its weak legislation,
echoing Evans’ (2004) critique of “the presumption
that the most advanced countries have already
discovered the one best institutional blueprint for
development and that its applicability transcends
national cultures and circumstances.”
The operation mode seems to be to establish
institutions that fit international models and comply
with regional ADB policies, even if other aspects of
the administrative and political configuration are
lacking, or are even in contradiction with them.
Unsurprisingly, once these institutions are
established they need substantial ‘assistance’ to
become effective, or in some cases simply active,
in particular if these are new and do not fit into the
existing government structure. Thus, the Law on
Water Resources “gives a great deal of valuable
guidance… but further work will be required to
develop both policy and legislation on important
topics coming under the LWR”, newly-hatched
RBOs “need to be activated and strengthened…
and their functions and mode of operation need to
be clarified” (ADB 2001a), the NWRC and ONWRC
“now need to become fully functional,” and be
“assisted through the early stages of formation
and growth to become sustainable, capable and
respected bodies in the water sector,” while “MARD
should do as much as possible to create the
necessary conditions for successful strategic
planning.”
Critics will point to a variant of top-down and
untimely imposition of concepts and reforms by
foreign experts and development banks
(Bandaragoda 2006); a new version of the Model-
T (or copycat) syndrome in development described
by Chambers (1997); and to the ‘decontextualized’
promotion of general principles that generate the
need for what these actors are precisely ready to
offer, be it loans, technical assistance or projects
that are meant to produce draft legislations, sector
reviews, profiles, strategies, or master plans and to
‘strengthen’ participation by various forms of
capacity building.
An important point that needs to be
emphasized is the gap between the formal
mandate of newly established institutions and the
way these operate in practice. There is pervasive
over-enthusiasm on the expected performance of
these institutions. For example, in 2001, a report
of the ADB president to the board of directors
(ADB 2001b) stated that the RRBO was “expected
to be fully operational by June 2002 and to convene
the first meeting of the [Red River Basin] council.”
Yet, even if apex bodies or RBOs are active there
is no assurance that they will fulfill their
coordination and negotiation roles as expected. In
contrast to the conventional IWRM principles, which
tend to see the balancing of objectives of equity,
efficiency and environmental sustainability as
resulting from well-meaning and informed
negotiation, new arenas of interaction do not
necessarily lead to desirable outcomes. In
Thailand, for example, the apex body was decried
by some as a forum for ministries to engage in turf
battles or horse-trading rather than for optimizing
coordination (Newborne 2006). Likewise, RBOs do
not necessarily optimize decisions because
outcomes depend on the distribution of power
(horizontally and vertically) rather than on the mere
existence of an institution that is supposed to
ensure coordination.22
More positively, others will consider this
process as a variant of the muddling-through type
of policy planning (Lindblom 1970), where it is
important to make small and incremental steps
towards a general desirable blueprint whenever
that is possible; hoping that contradictions will
gradually solve themselves out. MoNRE, or RBOs,
for example, have been created in adverse
environments but their principle may be activated
by a few champions who, with time and the
sustained influence of donors, will work to achieve
increased consistency. The Law on Water
Resources may be rewritten to enshrine a new
division of roles between MARD and MoNRE.
Of course, there is no assurance that this will
happen. Policy reforms may abort, be
discontinued, or simply be rejected (as it happened
in many countries like Pakistan, Thailand or Sri
Lanka, to take Asian examples; Bandaragoda
2006). Processes can revert themselves, especially
when they have gone too far in too little time:
MoNRE could be swallowed by MARD that would
reincarnate into an all-powerful water ministry (as
floated by officials in 2006; see Olszak 2006). But
the alternative is to dismiss possible external
influence and wait for things to sort themselves out;
with equal uncertainty about whether something is
going to happen at all.
With hindsight, it seems that the policy
reforms on RBOs promoted by donors and
development banks have triggered some
changes. Surprisingly, these changes may have
come as a result of the institutional confusion
they have created when confronted with the
emergence of the MoNRE, rather than being due
to the reforms themselves. MoNRE was itself
largely destined, at first, to help solve land and
environmental issues rather than water issues,
and owed little to external influence. The
confluence of donor-driven projects on establishing
RBOs and the conflict between MARD and
MoNRE that put the river basin scale as a
contested issue, helped strengthen changes in
the direction of a better separation of duties and
integrated planning (although - just like in Thailand
- it seems that MoNRE does not aim at a mere
regulatory role and also claims planning
functions). The river basin scale is crucial for
defining legitimacy and roles but is also a level at
which power over financial resources and political
power could be defined. In a context where state
enterprises are moved out of ministries and where
most consultancy work is being outsourced,
power will reside in planning and in the decision-
making on what shall receive priority, where and
when, and who shall do the job. It is too early to
assess if, and how, MoNRE and RBOs will,
eventually, substantially reshape the institutional
landscape, but such evolutions can only be slow.
The question as to what the best way forward
is for external partners – somewhere between
mechanical interventionism and a wait-and-see
attitude – is likely to remain. In practice,
institutional change is linked to political evolution,
to the ever-changing power configuration of
individuals and groups within the state and the
administration who carry out varied projects,
sometimes enlightened sometimes not, and
subject to an uncertain mix of endogenous and
exogenous influences. It may be always possible,
with hindsight, to opt for one or another path.
Whether the rather indiscriminate grafting of the
formal attributes of IWRM will bear fruits may
eventually depend on internal processes whereby
different individuals and groups will use the space
created to push for their agendas.23
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